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Introduction 
Citizenship and Urban Issues 
in Jordan
Myriam Ababsa
“Although one of the essential projects of nation-
building has been to dismantle the historic primacy of 
urban citizenship and to replace it with the national, 
cities remain the strategic arena for the development of 
citizenship”. (HOLSTON & APPADURAI 1996 p. 187)
“The nation is divided into three lifestyles: those of 
urban residents, villagers and Bedouins “ (AL-DAJANI 
et al., 1966, Watani al-Saghir (My little country), p. 21; 
in NASSER 2005, p. 69)
This book addresses the extensively studied issue of national identity and 
citizenship in Jordan1 through the City, examining the forms of integration and 
demarcation of the different components of the population in urban areas. It 
aims to reconsider the divisions between Jordanians of Transjordanian origin 
and those of Palestinian origin and between men and women, the latter being 
‘diminished’2 citizens.  It will question the manifestations of these divides 
in terms of urban practices, political and community mobilization as well as 
discourses of identity in the neoliberal3 context of the early twenty-ﬁrst century,
1. WILSON, 1987 ; AMAWI, 1991 ; LAYNE, 1994 ; BOCCO, 1996 ; ABU ODEH, 1999 ; LYNCH, 1999 ; JOSEPH, 
2000 ; MASSAD, 2001 ; DROZ-VINCENT, 2004 ; ANDERSON, 2005.
2. Half the nation, i.e. women, must go through the mediation of men to exist as citizens. They cannot 
transmit their citizenship to their children and need the permission of male family members to obtain a 
passport, which makes them ‘reduced’ citizens who are forced to brandish their family status record book 
for any civil status procedures (AMAWI 2000, p. 159). 
3. “Neoliberalism is in ﬁrst instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” 
(HARVEY 2005, p. 2.).
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which tends to turn citizens into consumers and creates major divides within 
Jordanian cities. This work takes a diachronic approach that presents the role 
of towns in Jordan’s nation building, the management of urban spaces and the 
practices of individual urban residents, especially when these practices are 
detached from kinship afﬁliations. This is not a study of nationality (jinsiyya), 
but rather of citizenship (muwatana), in terms of (the desire for) citizen 
participation. Our goal is to reintegrate the City into discourse about the nation 
and citizenship in order to present the most recent forms of mobilization and 
inhabitant participation.
Because of its recent urban history, dating back to the late nineteenth century 
in Amman, Irbid, Madaba and Ma’an, and to the eighteenth century in Kerak 
and Salt, Jordan did not rely on its towns during the process of nation building, 
but rather on its countryside and badia4 where the army was recruited. Our 
hypothesis is that the Jordanian city has historically contributed little to nation 
building, or to the emergence of the citizen, the decisive factor being direct 
allegiance to the Hashemite monarchy. Urban spaces nonetheless became 
the setting for emerging citizen expression. In theory, thanks to the relative 
anonymity they offer, towns free individuals from their kinship ties. Urban 
public space is the best setting for ‘modernity’, deﬁned as the coexistence of
different modes of being5. However, not only have Jordanian towns contributed 
little to the emergence of ‘the citizen’, they actually play a decisive role in 
the reproduction of collective entities: families, religious communities and 
‘tribes’ - in the sense of a hierarchical system of differentiated allegiance 
(CONTE 2010). The Jordanian city is not a favourable space for the expression 
of citizenship detached from primary afﬁliations6, if one considers the citizen 
as a legal person who forges contractual relationships with other individuals, 
with society and with the state. More importantly, the fact that half of the 
population (women) cannot transmit their nationality (jinsiyya) excludes the 
possibility of true citizen participation (muwatana). Just as the inequality of 
citizenship between members of the population of Transjordanian origin and 
those of Palestinian origin, complicates the existence of a federated nation. 
However, in the capital, city residents manage to launch initiatives for citizen 
4. The semi-desert steppe inhabited by the Bedouins.
5. Presentation by Raphael Liogier, a sociologist of religion, entitled “Gender Equality: the ultimate 
challenge of modern citizen abstraction” at the conference on Women’s rights in Muslim Arab societies 
organized by the IEP of Aix-en-Provence and the department of legal cooperation of the French Ministry of 
Foreign and European Affairs, in Amman, 17-19 November 2009. 
6. This idea was expressed in discussions during the ﬁrst preparatory conference for this book, in
Amman on September 6, 2006.
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participation for the community, showing they belong to a post-modern urban 
elite (BEITO 2002) and even making the city participate in a form of “global 
citizenship”. Admittedly, these urban residents who are at the forefront of 
associative movements are often members of privileged social networks (with 
connections to the Royal Palace, capital and international organizations) that 
set them apart from the rest of society, but this does not make them any less 
active.
Jordanian towns have large morphological and historical differences, 
and Amman should be distinguished from the others. Its functions as the 
capital combined with the variety of its population (a core of Circassians and 
Bedouins plus Lebanese traders, Syrian ofﬁcials and hundreds of thousands
of Palestinian refugees, and more recently Iraqi refugees, many of whom are 
served by Asian servants and Egyptian labourers) lead Amman to fully play 
its urban role as a “place for maximisation of social interaction” (CLAVAL 
1981, p. 4). Thanks to its shopping centres, parks and the public squares of the 
wealthier districts of the city, the inhabitants of Amman manage to escape the 
social control of a conservative society that keeps women and deviants under 
surveillance7. Within the camps and poor neighbourhoods of the capital, travel 
and movement is less free, high population density increases surveillance 
and the high cost of public transport reduces mobility. The small towns of 
Salt, Ajloun, Ma’an and Kerak which have very few Palestinian refugees 
are still organized around families and tribal clans, whose madafa (places of 
hospitality where social life and local politics are discussed) structure urban 
space (MAFFI 2004, JUNGEN 2009). Consequently, all travel and movements 
are tightly controlled in these small towns, and public space offers no real 
possibility for anonymity8. 
Increasing urbanization9 poses new challenges to the regime: controlling 
urban sprawl, access to services for the poorest populations of Palestinian 
refugees in Amman, Zarqa and Irbid, as well as security issues at a time when 
tribal conﬂicts are on the rise in towns and splinter jihadist groups settled in
Zarqa, Russeifa and Irbid over twenty years ago. Indeed, both Quietist and 
Jihadist Salaﬁst movements are essentially urban phenomena. The jihadists
7. Many studies focus on the use of public space in the Arab world. In particular DEPAULE 1985, 
MÉTRAL, BEYHUM, DAVID 1993 ; HANNOYER 1994 ; TAÏEB, BEKKAR, DAVID 1997 ; NACIRI, RAYMOND 1997 ; 
BERRY, DEBOULET 2000 ; NAVEZ-BOUCHANINE 2002.
8. Merely walking on the same pavement as a young girl, without even speaking to her, created a 
conﬂict between two families in Kerak in 2010 (story reported by Christine Jungen).
9. With an annual population growth rate of 2.9%, and a construction growth rate of above 4% (ABABSA, 
Atlas of Jordan, Ifpo 2011).
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are mainly based in the poorest neighbourhoods of Amman, Irbid, Russeifa 
and especially Zarqa10 (ICG 2005). While Quietist Salaﬁsts are more scattered
throughout the city of Amman, with many sheikhs living in the wealthy 
neighbourhoods of Abdoun and Marj el Hammam or living in villas in 
Tabarbour11. 
The challenges of urban management in towns that are permanent building 
sites, and whose urban structure is segregated between poor areas built 
around Palestinian refugee camps, middle-class neighbourhoods and ‘gated 
communities’, are all the more serious because Jordan’s social contract is 
challenged by various opposition movements.
I. Jordan’s contested social contract
In October 2002 and July 2006, the Hashemite regime launched two 
campaigns: “al-Urdunn Awalan” and “Kulluna al-Urdunn”, designed to 
strengthen national cohesion around a single reafﬁrmed Jordanian identity, in
a regional context which has been uncertain since September 11th 2001 and 
the second intifada (2001-2002). These campaigns are part of the complex 
history of the development of the Jordanian nation, which strives to integrate 
groups of diverse tribal and national origins: Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqis, 
Circassians and Bedouin tribes. This process of nation building has resulted 
in the enactment of successive laws relative to Jordanian Nationality (1954, 
1984); the implementation of electoral laws (1989 and 1993); as well as the 
integration into the political arena of the kingdom’s large urban and rural 
‘families’ (MASSAD 2001).
However, in spring 2010, the issue of national unity, which is a red line for 
all public expression in Jordan, was called into question by the manifesto of the 
“National Veterans’ Committee” which has sixty members, including former 
10. A survey conducted in Zarqa by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan after 
the death of the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Moussab al-Zarqawi, who claimed responsibility for the 
attacks on the 9th November 2005 in Amman, revealed that 30% of respondents regretted his death, and 
7% shared his values; i.e. around 28,000 people in a city with a population of 400,000 in 2004 (http://
www.orient-expressbloggercom.blogspot.com/2010/04zarqaberceau-du-salaﬁsm-jordanien.html). Orient
Express Website accessed on September 25, 2010. 
11. Romain Caillet notes that the Quietist Salaﬁsts, who are partners of those in power, have the right
to preach on Fridays, and have dozens of mosques spread throughout the city, while the jihadists have no 
right to do so. Either they boycott State mosques, or they go to mosques where the imam is closer to their 
ideas although he is not jihadist, or else they make the most of opportunities to use public space: during 
weddings, funerals and talks during Ramadan evening events (see infra).
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generals12. Dated April 1st, this manifesto denounces the fact that Jordan has 
become a substitute homeland for Palestinian refugees, with the complicity of 
senior ofﬁcials of Palestinian origin. It calls for the removal of the nationality
rights of Jordanians of Palestinian origin and for their return to the West Bank, 
either immediately or after implementation of UN Resolution 19413. It also 
calls for the inclusion in the constitution of the severing of ties with the West 
Bank on July 31, 1988. Finally, it denounces corruption and calls for further 
economic reforms. Ahmad Obeidat, the former prime minister and also the 
former Director of Central Intelligence and of the National Committee for 
Human Rights, therefore launched in May a counter-manifesto signed by 
thousands of Jordanian personalities, of Transjordanian and Palestinian origin, 
calling for national unity but also for the breaking-off of the peace agreement 
with Israel (DAVID 2010). Following the atrocities of Israel in Lebanon (the 
war in the summer of 2006), in Gaza (bombing attacks from December 2008 
to January 2009) and constant attacks in the West Bank, most of Jordan’s 
population now rejects the peace accord signed in 1994. Citizens are concerned 
about rising food prices, the costs of electricity, fuel and housing, and are tired 
of corruption. On June 8, 2010 during his speech commemorating the Arab 
Revolt of 1916, on the national day celebrating the army, the king reminded 
the country that “national unity is a red line that he will allow no-one to cross” 
and called all attempts to do so ﬁtna. Fitna is a strong term for it refers to the 
division of the Muslim Ummah (CURTIS 2010). 
Unequal and ‘undifferentiated’ citizenship14 
Citizenship is unequal in Jordan because for some members of the 
population it depends on the permanent status of Palestinian refugees. Since the 
12. Full text in Arabic on the website of Kull al-Urdunn (http://allofjo.net/web/?c=153&a=20972) 
accessed on October 3, 2010.
13. Resolution adopted on December 11, 1948, which recognizes the right of refugees to return home. 
14. The theory of “differentiated citizenship” was developed by Iris Marion Young concerning 
oppressed groups such as women, non-whites, workers, the poor, disabled people, the elderly, gays and 
lesbians in Western democracies. To resolve what she calls the “paradox of democracy” where social power 
makes some people more equal than others and equality of citizenship makes some people more powerful 
(YOUNG 1989, p. 259), she suggests we develop mechanisms for the representation of self-formed groups 
so they can express their speciﬁcity, calling into question the universality of citizenship. Differentiated
citizenship would thus be « the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full 
citizenship »  (YOUNG 1989, p. 251).
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severing of ties with the West Bank in July 1988, different colours of passports 
indicate unequal degrees of citizenship within the nation15. The Palestinians 
who arrived as refugees in 1948 in the West Bank and in Transjordan acquired 
Jordanian nationality in 1949, which was then formalized in 1954, and they 
have a national number (al-raqm al-watani). The 1967 war and the occupation 
of the West Bank by Israel led to the arrival on the east bank of the River 
Jordan of 300,000 ‘displaced’ Palestinians with Jordanian nationality. In 
July 1983 the Jordanian government introduced green and yellow travel 
documents for Palestinians - who became Jordanians in 1949 – from the West 
Bank (which has been occupied since 1967): green documents were for those 
who had stayed in the West Bank, yellow ones for those who had left and had 
settled on the east bank of the River Jordan. These documents were supposed 
to facilitate crossing the Allenby Bridge in both directions (in to Jordan for 
green cards and to the West Bank for yellow cards)16. In 1988, following the 
royal decision to sever ties with the West Bank, only those Jordanians living on 
the east bank of the River Jordan were able to keep their Jordanian nationality; 
those who lived in the West Bank (and had green cards) lost it17. Following the 
Oslo peace accord in September 1993, West Bankers acquired papers from the 
Palestinian Authority in 1994 (the ﬁrst step towards Palestinian nationality).
As well as these groups there are also the refugees from Gaza who only have 
two-year Egyptian travel documents (EL-ABED 2005, see infra al-Husseini). 
15. As stated by Oraib Rantawi, director of the al-Quds Research Centre, in discussions during the 
second preparatory conference for this book, September 6, 2007 at al-Hussein Cultural Centre. 
16. “In 1983 the Jordanian government issued yellow crossing cards, which represented full residency 
for Palestinian Jordanians (with full citizenship rights in Jordan) for those who had left the West Bank 
for the East Bank to reside permanently in Jordan before June 1 of that year and had family reuniﬁcation
cards. They also issued green crossing cards for holders of temporary two-year passports who have no right 
of residence for those who left the West Bank after June 1, 1983. Green card holders can visit Jordan for 
only up to a month at a time. Thus it is really no more than a travel document, of the type also issued to 
Palestinians by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Jordan in 1996 announced that green card holders can 
apply again for ﬁve-year passports but such a passport does not constitute full citizenship. Families given
green crossing cards had to give up their family book (which are given to Jordanian citizens to register 
their family members). As non-Jordanians, this group of green card holders, estimated at almost 725,000, 
stopped having access to public services. Their stay in Jordan requires them to apply for a residency 
permit. In some emergency situations – such as during the second intifada – their entry becomes even 
more restricted and conditioned upon issuance of a special permit of entry known as adam mumana  (a ‘no 
objection’ document) issued by the Interior Ministry” (IDRC 2009, p. 13).
17. And therefore also Jordanians of Palestinian origin who hold green cards but who left the West 
Bank between 1983 and 1988, although the decision to sever ties only applied to West Bank residents 
before July 31, 1988.
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However, since 2009, the Hashemite regime has decided to withdraw the 
Jordanian nationality of yellow card holders who have not renewed their 
residence in the West Bank under occupation. Jordan’s position is ﬁrm: Jordan
is not the substitute homeland for Palestine (watan badil) that Israel would like 
it to be, and the 280,000 Jordanians who have residence cards and property 
in the West Bank should keep them18. Thus, any Jordanian citizen who is 
deprived of his Israeli residence permit also loses his Jordanian nationality19. 
This complex and controversial issue of the position of citizens of Palestinian 
origin in Jordanian society explains the mistrust the regime shows towards 
large towns and their under-representation during legislative elections, since 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin are in the majority (Abu Roumman). 
Citizenship and urban issues 
The rebuilding of a Jordanian ‘social contract’ relates back to the urban 
issue. With 82% of Jordan’s population living in urban areas, and almost 
half in the Greater Amman-Russeifa-Zarqa conurbation (2.9 million out of 
a population of 6.5 million in 201020), urban areas, and especially the cities 
of Amman, Zarqa and Irbid, are considered suspect because they house the 
majority of people whose allegiance to the Hashemite crown is regularly 
questioned, notably the Palestinian refugees in the camps (even though they 
acquired Jordanian nationality in 1949). While political ofﬁce and most
employment opportunities are concentrated in Amman, the Hashemite capital 
remains underrepresented politically. Due to the more diverse backgrounds of 
those living in large cities, particularly in the kingdom’s capital, the political 
expression and representation of urban dwellers are highly controlled. The 
Hashemite regime has ensured, via successive electoral laws, that it relies 
on the entire country, especially rural areas, which historically support the 
18. http://jordantimes.com/index.php?news=23711.
19. In February 2010, the publication of the Human Rights Watch report on this issue was controversial 
(http://www.hrw.org/node/87906). In this report, denounced by the Jordanian government, HRW 
condemned the withdrawal of nationality for around 2,732 Jordanian citizens who held yellow Jordanian 
papers between 2004 and 2008. Although in principle the government’s position is understandable, the 
practical and symbolic consequences are tragic for those people who found themselves stateless overnight. 
The question is all the more sensitive since on April 13, 2010, the Israeli government enacted military 
measures that classify as “inﬁltrated” any Palestinian without an Israeli residence permit.
20. According to the Greater Amman planning and development programme published in 2008.
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regime (BOCCO 1996). Analysis of Jordanian elections since the ﬁfties21, and 
in particular voting methods, reveals a phenomenon of political emergence 
and consolidation in rural areas, including within urban constituencies, which 
have been won by candidates from the countryside who settled in towns 
during the massive rural depopulation from 1960-197022. After the victory of 
the Islamists in Irbid’s municipal elections in 1999, and at a time when many 
Islamist opponents became members of municipal councils, a new municipal 
law was enacted in 2002 allowing the king to appoint the mayor of every town 
and half the members of municipal councils. This law was amended in 2007. 
And concerns only Amman since. 
Yet the main urban rebellions that rocked the country occurred in small 
towns with a majority Transjordanian population, which traditionally support 
the Hashemite regime: Salt and Kerak in the 1970s, and Maan in 1988 and 
2002 (ICG 2003, CSS 2003). As well as increased food prices in the context 
of structural adjustment policies called for by the IMF, each time the reason 
was their refusal to be ostracized from the spheres of economic and political 
decision making. Transjordanian populations were loyal to the monarchy 
but far removed from the regime and thereby had no advantage of access 
to employment.  Furthermore, they did not have the substantial beneﬁts of
those refugee citizens registered with UNRWA (education, free health care, 
employment opportunities with UNRWA etc.). These Transjordanians sent 
a strong warning signal to the regime as a prelude to the resumption of 
parliamentary life in 1989. 
Tribal conflicts in towns 
Between the summer of 2009 and the summer of 2010, several urban riots 
occurred throughout the country: in Ajloun, Salt, Maan, Irbid and Amman, 
and forced the government to declare brief states of siege, blocking the 
cities concerned for one or two days. In most cases, the conﬂict arose from
a settlement of scores between rival tribal clans, but more often from violent 
police actions resulting in the death of a man, which was subsequently avenged 
21. Note that parliamentary life in Jordan was suspended from 1957 to 1989. During these years, 
only professional trade unions and associations, especially those of the Muslim Brotherhood, were able to 
continue structuring politics. 
22. Thus, families from the villages of al-Bariha (Tbeishat and Kufa families) Eidun, Husun, Naimeh 
and al-Sarih from the Irbid countryside became the competitors of traditional notables in Irbid, the coalition 
of the Tell and Bataineh families, with whom they competed in the municipal elections of 1979 and the 
parliamentary elections of 1989 and 1993 (DROZ-VINCENT 2000, p. 277).
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by his clan. What is new is the resurgence of such acts of tribal conﬂict, and
the fact that police ofﬁcers under investigation must in turn settle the conﬂict
through tribal arbitration, even though they were performing their duties. In 
particular, the systematic use of clan arbitration during the atwa, the three-day 
truce agreed for conciliation and the paying of blood money, takes precedence 
over the law and further contributes to the weakening of the State. 
The ﬁrst urban riot took place in late August 2009 in Ajloun after the
assassination of Ashraf al-Momani by his former brother-in-law who was a 
member of the Samadi clan (SCHWEDLER 2010). In retaliation, Momani clan 
members set ﬁre to the house of the assassin and to the shops in town owned by
the Samadi clan. Despite police intervention, the conﬂict lasted a week, during
which the town of Ajloun was placed under siege, with entry points into the 
town being blocked by special police forces, darak. In early November 2009, 
the beating and subsequent death of Sadem Saoud, a twenty year-old pedlar in 
Hay Tafayleh, in downtown Amman, after an altercation with a city ofﬁcial,
led to a riot in which six police ofﬁcers were shot and wounded, a police
booth was burned and several shops vandalized. The police retaliated with 
tear gas, sparking panic in a densely populated area ﬁlled with schools, in
the morning. A few days later, the city of Ma’an was the scene of week-long 
clashes between the police and armed tribal groups, after the death of Fakhri 
Anani Kreishan, 47, who was killed by truncheon blows from a police ofﬁcer
because he was sheltering a man in his house who had written bad cheques. 
The road from Aqaba to Amman was blocked overnight by the rioters. The 
Interior Minister, Nayef Qadi said these were isolated events but that police 
ofﬁcers who commit acts of excessive violence should answer for their acts
(Jordan Times, November 16, 2009). 
These riots are small compared to the urban rebellions of the late 1980s and 
2002 which mobilized entire towns’ populations and caused dozens of deaths. 
Yet their proliferation over a few months became a social phenomenon that 
alerted the authorities and intellectuals, especially since the conﬂicts between
rival families spread to major universities in Jordan. On January 21 and 22, 
2010, the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan held a forum 
entitled “The Rule of Law and Rising Social Tensions” in the presence of 
politicians, security ofﬁcers, representatives of civil society and researchers23. 
During the forum, the Jordanian Public Security Directorate announced that 
the number of “tribal conﬂicts” had soared in 2009 to 229, including 70 in the
city of Amman, 38 in the north, 59 in the south, 47 in the central region, 10 
23. http://esc.jo/en/content/110 (site name)
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in the Aqaba region and 5 within the Royal Bedouin Guards (ZAYDAH 2010). 
The upsurge in tribal conﬂicts should not be interpreted as a rise of tribalism,
but rather as a sign of the breakdown of the tribal system. Clan members 
who have become wealthy, free themselves from tribal hierarchy and deal out 
justice themselves, until the conﬂict becomes so intense that traditional clan
leaders are forced to intervene to arbitrate the situation24. 
The most serious consequence is the frequent use of atwa, tribal arbitration, 
instead of legal justice. The Interior Minister, Nayef al-Qadi stated during a 
forum organized by the University of Jordan that only law enforcement can 
maintain order and strengthen the State, and that tribal atwa is merely a parallel 
system that cannot be a substitute for the law. He added that clan leaders usually 
assist security forces to resolve conﬂicts. The danger is both the impunity of
tribe members during atwa and the inequality of citizens before the law, an 
essential foundation of democracy. Even more worrying; police ofﬁcers who
commit violent acts also have to answer for their actions during atwa in the 
case of homicide. In which case, they are no longer the defenders of the law, 
but tribal members answering for their actions before their clans. This further 
weakens the State and law enforcement ofﬁcers are therefore considered as a
powerful tribal clan among others, according to Ahmad Abu-Khalil (ZAYDAH 
2010). The global economic crisis that hit in 2008 and affected Jordan (whose 
external debt reached 60% of GDP in 2009), is certainly a decisive factor in 
the reinforced vigour of clans and extended families, whose members with 
inﬂuence in the economic sphere are able to help people ﬁnd work, and at least
help ﬁnancially25. 
*
24. According to Mazen al-Qadhi: “reducing the inﬂuence of the clan over its members is behind
this surge of clashes. The inﬂuence of the clan and the family has been replaced by that of economic
leaders, businessmen and individuals with ﬁnancial inﬂuence or interests with heads of companies.”
(ZAYDAH 2010).
25. In spring 2010, new tribal clashes took place in the city, blocking main roads to Amman. In 
April 2010, the town of Salt was cordoned off by police after a ﬁght between two students at the Balqa
Applied University which resulted in the death of one of them: Osama Abbadi aged 20 (Jordan Times, 
April 11, 2010). That same month, two families from Kerak: Thuneibat and Kafaween, fought over a land 
dispute, settling their score in Amman, on Jabal Nadhif, where one of the members was killed in his shop 
in retaliation for the assassination of a member of the opposing clan. The two families were driven out of 
Kerak by the government and relocated in two different governorates (Jordan Times, April 23, 2010). The 
latest riot occurred in the afﬂuent neighbourhood of Khalda in west Amman, after an anti-narcotics police
ofﬁcer killed a 31 year-old man in his home: Abdul Salam Mthari Neimat, who was suspected of drug
trafﬁcking, during a violent search. His family then set ﬁre to a police station on Mecca Street, one of the
city’s main thoroughfares, blocking it for several hours (Jordan Times, May 6, 2010). 
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In this tense context, this work aims to clarify the role of urban elites in 
nation building and the development of citizenship (in the ﬁrst part), analyzing
the challenges of urban management, which aims to open up the city’s most 
disadvantaged areas and upgrade the services provided for them (second 
part), and ﬁnally to highlight the signiﬁcant urban disparities between poor
neighbourhoods, strongholds of the rise of extremism, the new downtown 
and the gated communities built in the outskirts of towns (third part). The 
book brings together some of the papers presented during two symposia 
titled Towns and National Identity in Jordan held on September 13, 2006 at 
the Intercontinental Hotel and on September 6, 2007, with the assistance of 
Rami Daher at the al-Hussein Cultural Centre (programmes included in the 
appendix)26. This work pays tribute to its precursor: Amman, city and society, 
published by Jean Hannoyer and Seteney Shami in 1996 by the CERMOC27 
(HANNOYER & SHAMI 1996). 
2. Citizenship Developed with Reference to the Hashemite Monarchy
Although some Jordanian intellectuals lament the lack of an unbiased modern 
Jordanian historiography which would be a source of national cohesion, it 
should nevertheless be noted that the history of Jordanian Nation Building has 
been studied extensively, both by Jordanian researchers such as Ali Mahafazah 
(1973) Adnan Abu Odeh (1999), Mustafa Hamarneh (1995) and Hani Hourani 
(2009) as well as by Western researchers such as Mary Wilson (1987), Marc 
Lynch (1999), Joseph Massad (2001) and Betty Anderson (2005). Most agree 
that the Jordanian national identity is in essence linked to the Hashemite 
royal family, which is the only family able to federate heterogeneous social 
groups28. Yet their work also shows that Jordanian towns, even more so than 
26. The ﬁrst conference was funded by the Department for Cultural Cooperation and Action of the
French Embassy in Amman thanks to the Alembert Fund for the debate of ideas. The second had the 
support of the Agence universitaire de la francophonie. On the eve of the ﬁrst conference, a press report
noted that while the subject of the conference was valid, it was nevertheless unfortunate that it was initiated 
by a French research centre. However, the second conference was inaugurated by the Deputy Mayor of 
Amman, Amer al-Basheer, demonstrating the importance of scientiﬁc debate on this theme during the
preparation of the planning and development programme for the city of Amman. The articles written by 
Lise Debout and Romain Caillet were added due to their relevance to the book, to illustrate the management 
of urban services, and to present the public events of the Salaﬁst movement; the most conservative branch
of Jordanian society. 
27. The Centre for Study and Research on the contemporary Middle East, which was incorporated into 
the French Institute for the Near East (Ifpo) in 2003. 
28. Ali Mahafzah noted during the discussions at the preliminary conference in September 2006, that 
the Jordanian national anthem does not mention the name of Jordan.
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Syrian towns, have been melting pots for the integration of migrants, who 
were mostly Palestinian and Syrian traders during the nineteenth century.  
One feature of the Jordanian political landscape is that the kingdom’s 
major families play a direct role, without necessarily being part of the strong 
urban solidarity groups; `asabiyyat,29 that have shaped Syrian, Lebanese and 
Palestinian politics. Unlike the other states which arose out of the Bilad es 
Sham, Jordan experienced less than its neighbours this system of “politics 
of notables” studied by Albert Hourani in the 1960s (HOURANI 1968), which 
is “the ability of an urban patriarch, with strong economic foundations, to 
exercise control, coercive or symbolic, over the urban population on the basis 
of relatively independent power, tolerated as a mediator between the State and 
the local population” (PICAUDOU 1996). The historian Eugene Rogan prefers 
to talk about “economies of notables”, thus highlighting the different roots of 
the phenomenon of notability in Jordan compared with the rest of the Bilad 
al-Sham (ROGAN 1991 in DROZ-VINCENT 2004, p. 43). Jordanian notability is 
therein deﬁned by its ability to establish direct links with the king.Accordingly,
citizenship has developed in a space marked by the absence of urban spaces, 
solely with reference to the Hashemite monarchy. 
Ali Mahafzah shows here that the absence of towns in Jordan is linked to 
the absence of the State. Political awareness is linked to the development of 
education during the 1950s. However, the 1957 martial law and the banning of 
parties led to an increase of the sense of belonging to a tribe, village and region, 
thus thwarting the development of a national civic consciousness. Moreover, 
the fact that many administrative positions have been occupied since the 
1920s by Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese, under the British Mandate, has 
hindered the development of a national consciousness in Transjordanians, 
who are under-represented within institutions. 
Philippe Droz-Vincent reminds us that studying the role of towns in nation 
building also requires the study of the countryside and the badia, where the 
State recruits its army. From the ﬁfties, villagers and farmers supported the
State. “In Jordan, family pride, which is preserved in urban families and 
29. The ` asabiyya, group solidarity, is the key concept of the theory of Ibn Khaldoun on the evolution of 
the State in the medieval Arab world. It was extensively used by Michel Seurat in his analysis of the Syrian 
State. Olivier Roy deﬁned it as “any group of solidarity based on personal relationships (genealogical, 
marriage, vote-catching or allegiance, etc.) whose purpose is precisely solidarity itself and not the 
implementation of an objective which justiﬁes the creation of the group”, it remains a relevant form of data 
for the analysis of Middle Eastern societies in the late 1990s, “(not as) the expression of the permanence of 
a traditional society in a modern state, but (as) a reconstruction of networks of allegiance in a political and 
territorial sphere which is permanently changed by the existence of the State. What remains, is not objects 
but a type of political relationship” (ROY 1996, p. 6-8). 
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their institutions (madafa30, family banquets etc), is echoed in other types of 
families (rural or Bedouin), who have often suffered from rural depopulation, 
have become rooted in the urban world and cultivate a family history. Towns 
seem more like a melting pot in which the elite of very different origins settle, 
rather than closed-in and exclusive environments seeking to protect their 
authenticity. The speciﬁcity of urbanism in Jordan is decisive here” (DROZ-
VINCENT 2004, p. 289).
The allegiance of the oldest Jordanian towns to the Hashemites did not 
come easily. Irbid and Kerak, which are intellectual centres of the Arab 
nationalist left, have long been regarded as untrustworthy towns. Christine 
Jungen shows, however, that the spirit of rebellion that characterizes the town 
of Kerak is consistent with its ﬁrm commitment to Jordan. The inhabitants of
Kerak build their sense of belonging and Jordanian identity not in reference 
to a collective identity, but in relation to the protection of their attachment to 
an institution: the Hashemite monarchy. For Kerakis, being Jordanian means 
being attached to the royal institution. The preservation of powerful local 
history reveals allegiance to the Hashemites, not to the nation. 
Irene Mafﬁ presents the stages of Jordanian national development through
the creation of its museums. The Citadel Museum, established in 1951, 
asserts the separate existence of Transjordan, as independent from Palestine 
under mandate. Subsequently, the Palestinian element and the Transjordanian 
element were integrated in a shared Hashemite identity with the folk museum 
opened in 1971, one year after the events of Black September; followed by 
museums of ‘modern’ history, i.e. Hashemite history, the history of the nation, 
during the 1990s. 
3. Urban Policy and Management of Citizenship
The historic weakness of Jordanian towns is reinforced by the high primacy 
index of the Hashemite capital, which is a refuge for hundreds of thousands 
of Palestinians and Iraqis. While the Municipality of Amman celebrated its 
centenary in 2009 by celebrating its status as a haven for all members of the 
national population, real problems of urban management prevail in poor and 
30. The Madafa, or “place of hospitality”, is an ancient institution for hospitality, characteristic of the 
sociability of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of the Middle East. It was originally the tent in which the 
clan leader received the men of his group to drink coffee and discuss common problems every evening. 
It was transposed into town, where it is sometimes called a diwan (AL-HUSBANI 1997, MAFFI 2004, JUNGEN 
2009, ABABSA 2009).
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informal settlements, which are under-equipped in basic services, in contrast 
to the High Density Mixed Use areas of Abdali, Zahran, Wadi Abdoun and the 
Airport Road where most investments and services are concentrated (PRKER 
2009). Amman alone draws 80% of direct foreign investment in Jordan, the 
rest being divided between Aqaba and the free zones. Forms of public-private 
partnership are developing for urban services, including refuse collection 
services which collaborate with well structured recycling companies (Lise 
Debout. However, municipalities are gradually being held to account by their 
residents, because they are now under pressure from urban activist groups 
made up of intellectuals and social workers, while Islamic charity NGOs are 
very active and based in the poorest neighbourhoods where they compete with 
Royal NGOs (such as the Jordan River Foundation and the Jordan Hashemite 
Fund for Human Development). 
The extra-territoriality of Amman and Aqaba 
In terms of management, Amman and Aqaba are treated as extra-territorial 
entities. Indeed, the two towns neither come under the control of the Ministry 
of Municipalities, nor that of their respective governorates. Aqaba, with a 
population of 80,000 inhabitants in 2004 and about 120,000 in 2010, is in 
an extreme situation since it has no municipal government and the governor 
has delegated all his duties to the ASEZA (Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority) which has been transformed into a management organisation with 
co-opted members. The management of the Greater Amman Municipality 
reports directly to the Prime Minister who is also Defence Minister. The 
Palestinian camps are managed by UNRWA (for housing, health, education 
and social services) and the Department of Palestinian Affairs (AL HUSSEINI 
2003). The Palestinian camps were extra-territorial pockets within Jordanian 
towns for ﬁfty years, until the launching of Community Infrastructure Programs
in 1997 by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation HUDC (Jalal al-
Husseini, see infra).
Since 1923, Amman has been the seat of power with the Royal Palace and 
parliament, yet the city has remained under-represented politically, compared 
with older Jordanian towns. Hussein Abu Roumman shows that three towns 
are underrepresented in legislative elections: Amman, Zarqa and Irbid.  The 
ﬁrst two because the majority of their population is of Palestinian origin -
which tends to vote for the Islamist opposition - and the third because it was 
managed by the Islamists. 10,000 votes are needed to win a seat in Kerak, but 
70,000 are needed in Amman (in the second district of Wahdat-Nazal). 
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The new imperative of “popular participation” (al-musharaka al-sha’biyya) 
For the past ﬁve years, the Greater Amman Municipality has reconsidered
the concept of local community participation in development projects. As early 
as the 1980s, residents of informal areas of the city were actively involved 
in the rehabilitation process of their neighbourhoods (Myriam Ababsa). 
The participatory approach was the social counterpart of the ultra-liberal, 
socially restrictive policies, which at the time were imposed on Third World 
states by international ﬁnancial institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. Emphasis is placed on the idea of a consensual 
partnership between states and residents – focused on the exploitation of 
the so far untapped “capital” of the population: human, physical, ﬁnancial
and, above all, social capital. However, participation is limited to improving 
the built-up environment with, at best, token cooperation (information and 
consultation), which never becomes political participation or true partnership 
between government and citizens (HICKEY & MOHAN 2008).
However, apart from the rehabilitation of informal areas, the notion 
of participation is underdeveloped by national and municipal institutions 
in Jordan, precisely because the precondition of any participation is full, 
complete and undifferentiated citizenship. From his appointment as head of 
the Municipality of Greater Amman in June 2006, Engineer Omar Maani has 
worked to improve communication and create forums for debate concerning 
the preparation of the planning and development programme. Between 
September 2007 and March 2008, four-hour long sessions were organized 
around major themes: social housing, public transport and heritage. The Mayor 
met with the concerned ministers, the key architects and building contractors, 
experts in all ﬁelds (academics, engineers, consultants and researchers) and
representatives of civil society (journalists, activists and students). Yet a true 
culture of participation is yet to be created: «we are asked to involve local 
residents, but we ourselves do not know what participation is», admitted the 
program manager for the urban regeneration of the old city centre in January 
201031. 
The emergence of residents’ associations 
In May 2006, the scandal of the sale of a plot of land set aside for the 
creation of a public park to a group of Gulf investors for the construction of 
31. Seminar on the rehabilitation of informal settlements in Jordan, organized by the University of 
Jordan by Lucas Oesch, PhD student from the Graduate Institute, associated with Ifpo, in January 2010.
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the Jordan Gates; two huge towers at the sixth circle, led to the dismissal of 
the former Mayor Nidal al-Hadid. In May 2009, the City Council was alerted 
by a protest movement led by important ﬁgures from Amman against the
building of a wall around the citadel. The project, funded by USAID, aimed 
to develop one of the city’s landmarks to make it more accessible to mass 
tourism. However, it included the construction of a wall which cut the citadel 
off from the houses which had been built informally on the slopes of Jabal 
al-Qalaa, and it was rumoured that a cable car was to be built, requiring the 
destruction of several houses. An association of residents and social workers, 
Hamzet Wasel (which means ‘hyphen’), intervened to defend the rights of 
residents and demand that they be informed. The mayor held a debate on the 
site on June 6, 2009, announcing that the wall would be lowered and that 
no destruction was necessary. In autumn 2009, the Jabal al-Qalaa residents’ 
committee was created to serve as an alternative to Hamzet Wasel. Since then, 
the proposed cable car project has been suspended, but the advocates of citizen 
participation remain on their guard. 
Hamzet Wasel, set up in Amman, had no equivalent in Aqaba. Thus in order 
to free up valuable land on the coast, the Shallaleh district, inhabited by 20,000 
people, half of whom were Palestinian refugees, was simply demolished in 
March 2010. The area’s residents were given free housing in the district of al-
Karama, located 5 km from the town centre. Their plight is complicated by the 
fact that residents of North Shalalleh32 are originally from Gaza, with Egyptian 
travel documents and thus devoid of Jordanian nationality. Yet the government 
had undertaken several programs to improve infrastructure in 1998 through 
the Housing and Urban Development Corporation and in 2003 through the 
ASEZA, while UNICEF had begun a four-year program to strengthen local 
communities and women’s associations. However, pressure from property 
prices and ﬁnancial interests disregarded the area’s residents, who, alone,
made up a quarter of the urban population (Rami Daher). The segregation of 
populations within the city of Aqaba has become a selling point. Residents of 
Tala Bay, a seaside resort of 400 luxury villas and apartments, ten swimming 
pools and a two kilometre-long private beachfront pride themselves on living 
in an “ideal community” (made up of the Jordanian elite that has beneﬁted
from liberal reforms) which gets together for the weekend, without visible 
religious differences; the resort has neither a mosque nor a church33. 
32. Those from South Shallaleh are Jordanians. 
33. Interview with the owner of a villa in Tala Bay, September 2010. 
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Associations and corporate social responsibility 
Some complain that the instruments for the building of citizenship: 
associations, unions, political parties and universities are obstructed in 
Jordan34. Political parties, which were authorized by a 1928 law, prohibited in 
1957 and authorized once again in 1989, suffer from an extremely restrictive 
law on funding, which has been widely studied35. The 1966 law on the 
freedom of association, which already limited considerably the freedom of 
NGOs and banned all political activity36 for them, was replaced in May 2008 
by Law No. 51 (amended by Law 22 of 2009) which is even more restrictive. 
Under this new law, the Ministry of Social Development registers all NGOs 
and authorises any foreign funding; the ban on political activity is maintained 
and certain religious activities are prohibited. The government stresses that 
the new system of registration is favourable to non-Jordanians (Palestinians 
and Iraqis living in Jordan), thus strengthening public space, but the Human 
Rights Watch refutes this position (FREER, KUBINEC, TATUM 2010, p. 20). 
In 2009, Jordan had more than 3,145 associations (110 women’s 
associations, 337 sports clubs, 1,120 charities, 1,030 cooperatives and 387 
cultural associations) as well as trade unions (17 labour unions, 14 professional 
unions)37 and four chambers of commerce (HOURANI 2009). But most were 
created before 1980 and some are merely intermediaries for the State. Moreover, 
apart from the women’s and Islamic organizations, these associations are 
devoid of political culture38. Many royal NGOs (RONGOs) have succeeded 
34. Communication from the lawyer and researcher Assem al Omari in September 2007.
35. The parties’ law enacted in 1992 sets the highly contested system of one man one vote, which 
favours tribal votes at the expense of parties. It was amended on March 17, 2007, and again on May 20, 
2010, before the November elections. Under the law of March 17, 2007, the government extends subsidies 
to parties, but requires control over their accounts, which must mostly come from known local sources. In 
addition, the law imposes a tenfold increase in the number of founding members for each party, i.e. from 50 
to at least 500, who must come from at least ﬁve governorates. Consequently, the number of parties dropped
from 36 to 14. The law of 2010 does not retract these highly contested conditions. It merely doubles from 
6 to 12 the number of seats reserved for women. 
http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/theme.aspx?cid=7&t=2.
36. According to the law of 1966, the activities of NGOs must fall within a predetermined list which 
is under state supervision, which prevents any changes and prohibits certain activities - such as funding 
weddings. Furthermore, they undertake to have no political activity (WIKTOROWICZ 2001, p. 117). 
37. Professional unions deliver professional license and administer pension funds of 160,000 members; 
one sixth of the population including women and children (LONGUENESSE 2007). 
38. We must pay tribute to the remarkable work of Mizan (scales); the legal association for the defence 
of human rights created in 1998 by former Minister Asma Khader and managed by Eva Abu Halaweh. 
Mizan provides free legal services to all citizens, even in the most remote rural and steppe areas with legal 
aid buses, it launches citizen awareness campaigns on the radio and has opened secret shelters for abused 
women in several cities (ABABSA 2007, p. 150-159). 
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in presenting themselves as NGOs from civil society and as such manage 
to attract and drain funding from international agencies. Since 1989, which 
marked the beginning of democratic opening-up but also the imposition of the 
IMF’s restrictive measures, family associations have developed signiﬁcantly
in Jordan.  Anne-Marie Baylouni analyses this as a form of self-protection 
for Jordanian society which is confronted with the liberalization of markets, 
referring to the theories of Karl Polanyi (BAYLOUNI 2006, p. 350). 
Since 2005, Jordan’s associations have been supplemented by a new type 
of structure, based on the idea of corporate social responsibility, demonstrating 
that some beneﬁciaries of the system are willing to reinvest their proﬁts into
the most disadvantaged communities. Thus, a group of Jordanian businessmen, 
including the CEO of Aramex, came together in 2005 to create the NGO 
Ruwwad (pioneers) in the heart of Jabal Nadhif, located east of Amman’s 
city centre, which is one of the city’s poorest neighbourhoods. One of the ﬁrst
projects was the building of a police station for the neighbourhood, reﬂecting
both local demand and private intervention in the security sector, which was 
a State prerogative. Three programs were implemented with the objective of 
community empowerment: 160 scholarships were awarded to young girls 
and boys of the area, in return for one day of voluntary work per week.  A 
library and a children’s centre were opened and discussions were organized 
for young people to express their aspirations39. Ruwwad plays a mediating 
role between residents and the State, replacing traditional notables with more 
resources and therefore more potential for success. Nevertheless, the efforts 
of this NGO, innovative as they may be, beneﬁt only a few hundred families
whose extreme poverty impinges on their ability to be full citizens. Although 
they are encouraged by the regime, these social responsibility initiatives are 
still very limited in Jordan, because of a certain corporate culture that tends to 
keep proﬁts within family and ‘tribal’ networks (FREER, KUBINEC, TATUM 2010, 
p. 34).
4. Urban Transformation and Social Disparities 
This third theme deals with urban space as the symbolic medium for 
politics. It reviews both major urban development projects in towns, and the 
city as public space and the tensions that arise from the increasing segregation 
39. www.ruwwad.net. Read the article by Christopher Parker and Pascal Debruyne “Reassembling the 
Political Life of Community”, forthcoming. 
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between informal settlements, middle-class neighbourhoods and gated 
communities. In a democracy, these tensions can lead to urban violence and 
ﬁerce claims to “rights to the city” (LEFEBVRE 1968) by populations which 
are admittedly relegated to the sidelines, but remain full citizens. In Jordan, 
however, these tensions are dangerously latent, both because the poorest 
residents are also those whose citizenship is the most fragile, and because 
police control is stronger. 
Amman is the city that has been experiencing the greatest population 
and real estate growth in the Middle East since 2003. 200,000 to 300,000 
Iraqis have ﬂed Baghdad for Amman since the 1990s, bringing with them
part of their ﬁnancial assets. The Jordanian capital aspires to establish itself
as a centre for services, like the city states of the Gulf. Amman works hard 
on its image as a modern capital at the crossroads of Western and Eastern 
inﬂuences (with shopping malls like those in the Gulf; European style terrace
cafes, British style clubs, Lebanese restaurants etc.). The new urban centre 
of Abdali and the Jordan Gates project show that the city is the major new 
destination for investors from Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf. But the ﬂip side
of these large projects is that they are intended for ‘elite’ city residents, who 
are major consumers and free to make decisions but who are the minority in a 
capital city with many poor areas (Rami Daher). 
The impoverishment of the urban population increased during the 2000s, 
at a time when the government launched several campaigns to reduce pockets 
of poverty in rural and desert areas, where over a quarter of residents live 
below the poverty line. Ahmad Abu Khalil presents the progressive separation 
between the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ in Amman as the city expands and becomes 
further segregated. In 2006, an active policy of social housing was launched by 
the Royal Diwan40, giving homes to the poorest citizens, and creating working 
class suburbs of ﬁfty brightly painted houses built on state land, outside urban
centres (Zarqa and Marka). Although recipients display portraits of the king 
on their doors and windows as a sign of gratitude, they all emphasize their 
isolation and the lack of services (subsidized shops and public transport) that 
isolate them and stigmatize them as poor. This policy was reinforced in 2008 
by the Royal campaign “Sakan Karim li ‘Aysh Karim”41 which aims to build 
100,000 homes in ﬁve years for JD 17,000 (raised to JD42 35,000 in 2010 
which requires loans with prohibitive interest rates, even when lowered to 
6%). These well-built homes are once again constructed in town suburbs, 
40. The king’s cabinet where his closest advisers sit. 
41. Ofﬁcially translated into English as: “Decent Housing for Decent Living”.
42. The Jordanian dinar is pegged to the U.S. dollar: 1 JD = 1.4 U.S. dollar. 
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forcing residents to pay high transport fares. In order to ﬁll these blocks of
ﬂats, the Diwan gave the fourth-ﬂoor apartments to the Ministry of Social
Development, which gives them rent free to the poorest families on social 
security beneﬁts (which range from JD 40 for a single person to JD 180 for a
family of six or more). Yet since no mosques, schools or activity centres have 
been built in these new areas of local authority housing, which are isolated 
from town services, one wonders what form of society will develop there. 
Islamists and Salafists in Jordanian public space 
Due to its status as an association, and because it did not support the 
Palestinian Fedayeen in 1970, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to develop 
very early (from the 1960s and throughout the 1970s) an entire network of 
charities in Jordanian towns and even a large hospital in the heart of Amman. 
By winning 22 seats out of 80 in the general elections of 1989, the Muslim 
Brotherhood (and their political wing, the Islamic Action Front established in 
1993) became the main opposition to the regime, especially after their rejection 
of the peace accord with Israel signed in 1994. In 2010, when they announced 
a boycott of the November elections, their charitable networks have grown 
considerably in the city: besides 14 clinics and two hospitals, the Muslim 
Brotherhood manage, through the Islamic Centre Society, ﬁfty primary and
secondary schools (the Dar al-Aqsa network, for 16,000 middle class students, 
judging from the costly school fees), 56 orphanages (for 12,000 children) and 
a university in Zarqa (CLARK 2004 ; STEMMAN 2008 ; FREER, KUBINEC, TATUM 
2010). 
However, since the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has been faced 
with competition after the emergence of a Salaﬁ movement which is opposed
to it. Quietist and jihadist Salaﬁsts have made Amman a hotbed of ideology
and training that spreads worldwide through blogs and sermons broadcast over 
the Internet. Romain Caillet thus reveals a discrete urban reality which has 
crept into the neighbourhoods of East Amman, Zarqa Russeifa and Irbid, but 
which has also inﬁltrated the most exclusive districts of the capital (Khalda,
Abdoun and al-Muqablain). For the past two to three years, the authorities 
have carried out a programme of religious marking of Jordanian public space, 
using signboards that call conservative society to prayer, despite the fact 
that, by deﬁnition, neither the jihadist Salaﬁsts, who support armed struggle,
nor the Quietist Salaﬁsts, who are more conservative, wish to exercise their
citizenship by participating in the political management of their city. 
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Amman: a global city tempted by ‘global citizenship’ 
Amman has forged its own identity, resulting from the mixing of successive 
waves of migrants from Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, but also from the small 
towns in the interior of Jordan and the badia. The Ammani accent is proof 
of this, as is its cuisine, as noted by Ali Kassay. However, it is more difﬁcult
to ﬁnd people who call themselves ‘Ammani’ (Rami Daher). During the
debates of the second conference, minority voices testiﬁed to a form of urban
integration (indimaj), which manifests itself by the fact that some citizens 
highlight their shared experience (tajribe mushtarake) over and above their 
different origins. Thus the two levels of identity confront each other when 
the football teams of Faisali and Wahdat meet, but they are united when the 
national team plays. This common urban experience appeared occasionally 
after the attacks of November 9, 2005 that struck three hotels in the heart of 
Amman. The demonstrations of solidarity for the victims that were organised 
in the city testiﬁed to national unity, and portraits of the king and ﬂags were
placed in the windows of cars and buildings. 
On a smaller scale, an additional challenge for the Kingdom is that of 
establishing its capital following a ‘world system’; Amman is in the process of 
globalization, which is synonymous with an emerging ‘global citizenship’ and 
a public space for protest. For citizenship is more than the right to participate 
in political life; it includes the right to participate in public, economic and 
cultural spheres, all of which are performative elements of one’s belonging to 
a society (HOLSTON & APPADURAI 1996). Thus, groups of citizens communicate 
through their blogs, especially Creative Jordan, or organise associations, 
like Hamzet Wasel (hyphen), founded by the activist Raghda Boutros, who 
is the former director of Ruwwad. Hamzet Wasel organizes regular symbolic 
events, to reconcile the residents of Amman with their city; such as walking 
expeditions from one hill to another, which are ﬁlmed and blogged; workshops
where children from the Citadel (Jabal al-Qalaa) make kites (October 2009); 
and discussions with intellectuals and cultural activists around the notion 
of public space in Amman (March 2010). Neighbourhood committees have 
thus been formed in recent years, trying to unite residents around projects 
which economically revitalize the old structures of Jabal Amman and Jabal 
al-Lweibdeh. An example is the Jabal Amman Residents’ Association 
(JARA), which, in 2005, launched the Souk JARA near the ﬁrst circle.  The
market is open every weekend from spring to autumn, with small stalls selling 
local handicrafts (sometimes made by the residents themselves: embroidery, 
mosaics, paintings, ﬂower arrangements etc.). Another example is the Jabal
Lweibdeh Association which set up a market on Fridays devoted to antiques. 
These projects are a real success, but a private security agency ﬁlters groups of
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youths in the public space, thus excluding from this form of urban experience 
a wide group of society and creating more frustration. 
*
Although the inequalities of citizenship that characterize Jordan undermine 
any meaningful participation of the population in politics, be it in urban or 
rural areas, the fact remains that citizen groups are able, albeit in minor but 
remarkable ways, to organize themselves if not to manage at least to change 
their urban setting. “While in Arabic the concept of citizenship comes from 
the term watan (nation), the terms that refer to civil (as in civil society) or 
civility derive from the term madina (city)” (DRIESKENS & MERMIER 2007, 
p.13). The role of cities in nation building, the politics of notables, museums, 
urban management, citizen participation, social inequalities and conservative 
religious expression in the public arena; these are the entry routes into 
citizenship through urban channels which are examined in this book43. 
43. Many thanks to Elisabeth Longuenesse, Edouard Conte and Christine Jungen for their editing and 
suggestions which I have endeavoured to follow.
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